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Abstract
This Essay explores the problems that have emerged over the right to parade since 1994. It be-
gins with a brief review of the historical significance of parades in Ireland before summarizing the
background to the current disputes. This Essay considers the causes of the problem, the arguments
of the various parties, and the development of legal controls on parades. The Essay then moves on
to review the attempts that have been made to resolve the issue. In particular, the Essay focuses
on the formal measures that have been taken by the British Government to resolve the disputes
rather than the practical measures taken to mediate, negotiate, and police the problems at a local
level. Such measures include the consideration given to the problem in the report of the Indepen-
dent Review of Parades and Marches, changes that have been made to the legislation governing
parading, and the formation of the Parades Commission with powers to issue legal determinations
over disputes.
REGULATING RIGHTS AND MANAGING
PUBLIC ORDER: PARADE DISPUTES AND
THE PEACE PROCESS, 1995-1998
Neil Jarman*
The Good Friday Agreement contains no references to pa-
rades, marches, processions, or demonstrations. The section of
the Agreement on human rights mentions neither the impor-
tance of the right to freedom of assembly in a democratic society
nor the social responsibilities that accompany human rights.
The section on economic, social, and cultural issues barely ex-
tends its interest beyond the significance of language as a cul-
tural marker, although it does acknowledge the sensitivity of the
use of symbols and emblems for public purposes and the need,
in particular, for creating the new institutions to ensure that
such symbols and emblems are used in a manner that promotes
mutual respect rather than division.
Over the past four years, however, disputes over the right to
march, the expression of cultural traditions, and the displaying
of symbols, emblems, and regalia have grown in significance and
have often dominated the political agenda. The annual march-
ing season has hung over the peace process like a brooding sum-
mer storm. Each year the growing number of protests by mem-
bers of the Nationalist community against parades by the Protes-
tant loyal orders have threatened to disrupt and destroy the
fragile bonds of trust that have begun to be built between the
two communities. The first year of the agreement has been
marked by continuing, and often violent, protests in Portadown
over the demand by Orangemen to be allowed to walk past and
through the predominately Nationalist community on the
Garvaghy Road. Drumcree V, which is due in July 1999, already
looms large as a threat to a permanent peace.
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-This Essay explores the problems that have emerged over
the right to parade since 1994. It begins with a brief review of
the historical significance of parades in Ireland before summa-
rizing the background to the current disputes. This Essay con-
siders the causes of the problem, the arguments of the various
parties, and the development of legal-controls on parades. The
Essay then moves on to review the attempts that have been made
to resolve the issue. In particular, the Essay focuses on the for-
mal measures that have been taken by the British Government to
resolve the disputes rather than the practical measures taken to
mediate, negotiate, and police the problems at a local level.
Such measures include the consideration given to the problem
in the report of the Independent Review of Parades and
Marches, changes that have been made to the legislation gov-
erning parading, and the formation of the Parades Commission
with powers to issue legal determinations over disputes.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Holding a parade to commemorate significant historical
events, as an adjunct to religious worship, as a political display, as
a show of strength, or simply as a social occasion has been a fea-
ture of Irish life since the fifteenth century. Following the for-
mation of the Orange Order in 1795, parades have also become
increasingly instrumental as markers of collective identity and as
a means of claiming territory.' There is also a long history of
violence at parades. A man was killed following a dispute at the
first Orange parade in 1796, and trouble continued to erupt
with regularity at parades through the early nineteenth century.
In 1832, the government introduced the Party Processions Act,
which prohibited all such parades in Ireland. The act was re-
newed on an annual basis until 1845 when it was allowed to
lapse, but an almost immediate recurrence of violent clashes led
to its re-introduction in 1850. It remained in force until 1872
when it was repealed.
Parades continued to provoke persistent but relatively mi-
nor trouble in many areas of Northern Ireland, but such
problems were largely contained or dealt with by the local con-
stabulary under the common law. Partition of the island in 1921
1. NEILJARMAN, MATERIAL CONFLICTS: PARADES AND VISUAL DISPLAYS IN NORTHERN
IRELAND (1997).
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altered the balance of political power in the North. The Union-
ist community now dominated the political environment and the
vast majority of Unionist political representatives belonged to
one or more of the Protestant loyal orders. As a result, their
annual parades became almost state events, they were supported
and encouraged by the government, and cabinet ministers regu-
larly utilized the meeting at the field for political rhetoric. Or-
ange parades became an overt celebration of the Protestant com-
munity and of the Stormont state. In contrast, Nationalist pa-
rades and commemorations were heavily constrained and were
restricted by the police to those areas of Northern Ireland that
had an overwhelming Catholic population.2 Republican public
displays were further constrained under the Civil Authorities
(Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922, which permitted
the Minister for Home Affairs to prohibit any meetings, assem-
blies, or processions. This option was regularly taken up by the
minister and enforced with some thoroughness by the RUC.
The emergence of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Associ-
ation in the 1960s once again saw parades and demonstrations
emerge as a significant and contentious issue. Loyalists opposed
civil rights parades in many areas, and in response nationalists
began to mobilize against loyal order parades in certain areas.3
Derry became the primary flashpoint location and in August
1969 violence erupted following the annual Apprentice Boys
parade. The subsequent deployment of British troops, as rioting
and sectarian clashes spread to Belfast, is generally acknowl-
edged to mark the start of the Troubles.
Parades have been a recurrent, if irregular, source of disor-
der and violence in Ireland over the past two hundred years.
Such public displays of collective identity and strength have
often become particularly problematic at times of public debate
on larger political concerns over the constitutional status of Ire-
land or the position of the Catholic community within the wider
body politic. The years of the United Irishmen and the unifica-
tion of Ireland and Britain, O'Connell's campaign for Catholic
emancipation, the duration of the Home Rule campaign, Parti-
2. NEIL JARMAN & DOMINIC BRYAN, UNIVERSITY OF ULSTER, FROM RIOTS TO RIGHTS:
NATIONALIST PARADES IN THE NORTH OF IRELAND (1998).
3. EAMON MCCANN, WAR IN AN IRISH TowN (1980); BOB PURDIE, POLITICS ON THE
STREETS: THE ORIGINS OF THE CIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1990).
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tion, and the Civil Rights era have all been marked by contro-
versy and clashes over parading rights. On each occasion, one
or both parties have utilized parades to propagate their de-
mands, to mobilize support, to display their numerical strength,
and to claim or affirm territorial rights. From this perspective, it
is not surprising therefore that parades should have become a
contentious issue once the main paramilitary groups declared
their cease-fires and the emphasis shifted towards a negotiated
end to the conflict and a permanent political solution for North-
ern Ireland.
II. CURRENT PARADE DISPUTES
The present cycle of disputes came to public attention in
the spring of 1995 when the Lower Ormeau Concerned Commu-
nity group intensified their protests against loyal order parades
along part of the Ormeau Road in Belfast. However, it is impor-
tant to recognize that this action was an intensification of the
protests rather than the beginning of the campaign. In fact,
there had been public objections to parades by members of the
Nationalist community in a number of towns since the early
1980s, and annual protests had been maintained against parades
on the Garvaghy Road in Portadown since 1985.' The Ormeau
Road protest had begun in 1992 after an attack by the Loyalist
Ulster Freedom Fighters led to the death of five local people;
nevertheless, there was a sea change in the scale and significance
of the protests in 1995. The first protest was mounted on the
Ormeau Road on Easter Monday, April 17, and further protests
were made against eleven other parades over the next six
months. Furthermore, through the spring and summer similar
protests were made at towns and villages across Northern Ire-
land. Residents groups were formed in Bellaghy, Castlederg,
Derry, Dunloy, Portadown, Roslea, and elsewhere to demand
that local parades be re-routed. In some cases, the loyal orders
voluntarily re-routed their parade, in some cases they were re-
routed by the police, in some cases the protesting residents were
forced aside, and in a number of cases there was violence during
or after the parade.
4. Dominic Bryan, The Right to March: Parading a Loyal Protestant Identity in Northern
Ireland, 4 INT'LJ. ON MINORITY& GROUP RTS. (1997); DOMINIc BRYAN ETAL., UNIVERSITY
OF ULSTER, POLITICAL RITUALS: LOYALIST PARADES IN PORTADOWN (1995).
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Members of the various residents groups stated that their
objections were longstanding and genuine. They insisted that it
was the removal of the threat of paramilitary violence that gave
them a sense of security, which they had not felt before, to
mount public protests that they had not felt before. They in-
sisted that they were not opposed to loyal order parades per se,
but merely those that went through or near nationalist areas.
They demanded that the loyal orders recognize that the chang-
ing demographic profile in many areas meant that the parades
were no longer welcomed. They objected to the disruption to
daily life and to the increased security that was imposed for the
duration of the parade, and they resented being subjected to tri-
umphalist visual displays and sectarian music. The residents said
that they did not want the parades banned, but rather offered
two options. Either the parades should be re-routed away from
the nationalist areas or the loyal orders should be willing to en-
gage in discussion with the local people in order to find an ac-
ceptable compromise to the problem.
Members of the loyal orders, and the Unionist community
more generally, were not convinced by these arguments. They
saw the manipulative hand of Sinn Fain behind the protests,
which, they insisted, were no more than a change of tactics by
republicans to undermine the Unionist community. They felt
that the protests were an attack on their culture and on their
civil and religious liberties, rather than based on any genuine
objections. Members of the loyal orders claimed that most peo-
ple did not oppose the parade, most parades caused minimal
disruption, many had been following traditional routes for many
years, and, they were both peaceful and legal events. As a result,
they did not see any reason why they should negotiate with self-
appointed community representatives. Furthermore, they noted
that the spokespersons for many of the residents groups were
former republican prisoners, and they insisted that they would
refuse on principle to meet face-to-face with such people.
This refusal to engage in any face-to-face meetings with
members of the residents groups has remained a persistent argu-
ment by the loyal orders, even if the principle has been set aside
on occasion. As stated earlier, this objection was based partly on
a feeling that there was a fundamental right to parade and that
they did not need to negotiate the terms in which they exercised
their liberties. But they also followed the principles and prac-
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tices that had been set down by the political leadership of the
Unionist community who stated that they would refuse to en-
gage in face-to-face discussions with members of Sinn Fain while
the IRA retained their military capabilities. The loyal orders in-
sisted that the campaign against their parades was an integral
part of the wider republican political strategy, and they refused
to give any legitimacy to local republican activists by meeting
with them. The parade disputes were therefore widely seen from
the beginning as the localized expression of the wider political
process. Tactics adopted at the higher level of political negotia-
tion were mirrored at the lower level. It was clear that these two
domains of politics-negotiation and street activism-were in-
terconnected and that the nature of the parade disputes would,
to some extent, unfold in parallel to the wider peace process.
III. LEGAL CONTROLS
In the initial stages, the problem of disputes over parades
was regarded as a relatively minor matter, and an issue that
should be resolved by dialogue and compromise at a local level.
If local dispute resolution failed, then the police were expected
to deal with the issue on the ground and on the day of the pro-
posed parade. Although regular attempts were made to en-
courage the two principal opposing parties to engage in some
form of mediation process, and the official line has been to con-
tinue to encourage such approaches, a satisfactory compromise
was rarely achieved. On the few occasions that an agreement was
brokered, mistrust, rumor, and political manipulation served to
undermine local confidence in the deal.5 It was increasingly left
to the RUC to deal with the competing claims and demands.
However, leaving it up to the RUC to deal with this issue was also
increasingly seen as an unsatisfactory solution because it was ac-
cepted that it should not be within the remit of a police force to
attempt to adjudicate on what was essentially a political matter.
Police powers to deal with problems over parades were de-
fined within the terms of the Public Order (Northern Ireland)
Order 1987; such terms were the product of a gradual develop-
ment of public order legislation. Public order and parades had
5. NEILJARMAN & DOMINIC BRYAN, PARADE AND PROTEST: A DISCUSSION OF PARADE
DISPUTES IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1996); GRAINNE KELLY, MEDIATION IN PRACTICE: A RE-
PORT ON THE ART OF MEDIATION PROJECT (1998).
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initially been controlled under the Civil Authorities (Special
Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922, but the relevant clause
had been repealed in 1949. New powers were introduced under
the Public Order Act (Northern Ireland) in 1951, which was part
of a wider process of creating legislative parity with Britain.6 The
new act was based largely on the Public Order Act 1936, which
had been introduced as a result of the rise of fascist anti-semitic
violence and public opposition by communists in east London.7
The act gave the police the power to impose conditions on pa-
rades and/or to re-route them and gave the Home Secretary the
power to ban parades on the grounds of a serious threat to pub-
lic order. The act also required organizers of parades to give
forty-eight hours notification to the police, although it exempted
parades "customarily held along a particular route" from this re-
quirement. This exemption effectively meant that the loyal or-
ders did not have to provide any notification of their parades.
This was an era of relatively few parade disputes and the act
worked relatively effectively and proved uncontroversial until the
late 1960s when it was used to ban a number of civil rights pa-
rades. Then, in the early years of the Troubles, the widespread
public protests and disorder led to the act being revised in 1970
and again in 1971. The Public Order (Amendment) Act (North-
ern Ireland) 1970 increased the notification period for parades
from forty-eight to seventy-two hours and gave the Minister flexi-
bility to ban specific marches rather than simply imposing a gen-
eral ban on all parades in a given area. The Public Order
(Amendment) Act (Northern Ireland) 1971 extended the notifi-
cation period to five days, although once again "traditional pa-
rades" were excluded. The amendment also allowed for parades
to be banned if they imposed "undue hardship to persons work-
ing or carrying on business in the area" or made "undue de-
mand on the police or military forces." These various changes
and extensions were later consolidated in the 1981 Public Order
(Northern Ireland) Order.'
6. TOM HADDEN & ANNE DONNELLY, BELFAST COMMUNITY RELATIONS COUNCIL, THE
LEGAL CONTROL OF MARCHES IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1997).
7. Richard Thurlow, Blaming the Blackshirts: The Authorites and the Anti-Jewish Distur-
bances in the 1930s, in RACIAL VIOLENCE IN BRITAIN IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH
CENTURIES (P. Panayi ed., 1996); CHARLES TOWNSHEND, MAKING THE PEACE: PUBLIC OR-
DER AND PUBLIC SECURITY IN MODERN BRITAIN (1993).
8. Hadden & Donnelly, supra note 6; PETER NORTH ET AL., BELFAST STATIONARY
OFFICE, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF PARADES AND MARCHES (1997).
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The widespread inner city riots in London, Liverpool, Bris-
tol, and elsewhere in the early 1980s, and the violence of the
Miner's Strike of 1984-1985 raised the issue of public order to
greater political significance in Britain.9 In response to the
Scarman Report on the Brixton riots in 1981 and the Law Com-
mission report on public order in 1983, the government intro-
duced the Public Order Act in 1986.10 Extensive violence across
Northern Ireland in the wake of the signing of the Anglo-Irish
Agreement in 1985 ensured that a revised and extended Public
Order (Northern Ireland) Order was adopted in 1987.
Although much of the new order was a re-enactment and exten-
sion of earlier provisions, there were a number of significant
changes. The most important of these were that the required
notification period was extended from five to seven days and
that the exemption for customary or "traditional" parades was
removed. From now on, all parades were to be treated equally.
Other refinements were made with regard to the power of senior
police officers to impose conditions on a parade. If the officer
fears serious public disorder, serious damage to property, or seri-
ous disruption to the life of the community, or has a reasonable
belief that the purpose of the organizers is the intimidation of
others, then conditions could be imposed on the route taken, on
the number of participants, on the music played, or on the ban-
ners that were displayed. The power to ban a parade rested with
the Secretary of State. The legislation proved an adequate in-
strument for managing disputes and protests over parades until
the scale of the problem increased during 1995.
IV. POLICING PARADE DISPUTES
Throughout 1995, the police tended to take a pragmatic ap-
proach to disputes over parades. Appeals were regularly made
for the parties involved to negotiate a compromise or to take
part in mediation but, as noted above, this rarely proved success-
ful and it was then left to the police to adjudicate between the
opposing claims. Most often, the decision whether to allow the
parade to take place or to re-route it was left to the last minute
and was determined by which side had mobilized the largest
9. JOHN BENVAN &JOHN SOLOMOS, THE ROOTS OF URBAN UNREST (1987); BOB FINE
& ROBERT MILLAR, POLICING THE MINER'S STRIKE (1985).
10. RICHARD CARD, PUBLIC ORDER: THE NEW LAW (1987).
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crowd of supporters. If the protesters had gathered a large
enough crowd of people to oppose a parade, then the parade
was most likely to be re-routed. If, on the other hand, the loyal
orders posed a greater threat to public order, then the parade
would be pushed through. This simple equation was most ex-
plicitly demonstrated on the Ormeau Road in Belfast. Between
April and October, ten loyal order parades were re-routed from
the lower section of the Ormeau Road. Each of these was a rela-
tively small affair and the LOCC were able to mobilize a signifi-
cant opposition. However, two parades were allowed along the
disputed section of the road. The first was on the morning of
July 12 when thousands of Orangemen were on parade in Belfast
and they could therefore threaten a greater disruption if the
parade was not allowed through. The second parade was on Au-
gust 12 when members of the local Apprentice Boys club were
allowed to march on their way to the main Relief of Derry
parade. In July, the police had moved into the area early in the
morning to ensure that no protest was mobilized, but in August
protesters were physically, and in some cases violently, removed
from the road to allow the parade to pass by.
While the police always cited the appropriate sections of the
Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order, it was clear to every-
body that the ability to exercise the right to march was contin-
gent on the ability to mobilize a significant threat of force rather
than a moral or legal claim to notions of human rights. By wait-
ing until the last minute to make a decision, and often literally to
the last minute, the police made it clear that whoever had the
biggest crowd or could threaten the most disruption and vio-
lence would have their way. There were regular complaints
about this process. It was clear that responding to force of num-
bers was not an appropriate means of deciding issues of civil
rights. It was also suggested that leaving the decision to the last
minute served to exacerbate this problem as people felt the need
to mobilize to ensure their interests were addressed. There was
also concern that the decisions made by the police were inconsis-
tent. In some areas, the police seemed to favor the marchers,
while in others, they appeared to favor the protesters, and as
noted above, in some locations, decisions varied from parade to
parade. There was therefore a concern about consistency, about
the criteria used, and about the transparency of decision-making
over an issue that was accepted by all parties as a fundamental
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democratic right. By the end of the year, a number of voices had
been raised calling for a more just and equitable system of decid-
ing on competing demands, and a number of ideas had been
made of alternative means of dealing with the disputes. 1 How-
ever, when the marching season ended it was assumed, or
hoped, that the disputes would somehow be resolved by the next
year, and no action was taken to implement any changes or to
explore alternative means of dealing with the problem.
The issue came to a head the following summer. In July
1996, the RUC decided that the Orange Order parade to Drum-
cree Church should not follow the Garvaghy Road, but rather
should return to the center of Portadown along the outward
route. In 1995, protests against the parade by residents of the
Garvaghy Road had led to an impasse from mid-day on Sunday,
July 9, until a compromise was agreed and the parade took place
on Tuesday morning, July 11. When the RUC announced to the
Orangemen as they came out of the church that they would not
be allowed to complete their traditional route, they again deter-
mined to stay where they were until the police relented. In 1995
there had been a number of protests in solidarity with the
Portadown Orangemen, but when it became clear that the po-
lice did not intend to allow the 1996 parade along the Garvaghy
Road, protests erupted across Northern Ireland. Over the next
three days there was widespread rioting, violence, and destruc-
tion of property. A Catholic taxi driver was murdered by loyal-
ists. The tension increased as the Twelfth of July, the most im-
portant day in the Loyalist marching calendar, approached and,
on July 11, the Chief Constable, Hugh Annesley, reversed his ini-
tial decision."2 The Nationalist residents were cleared from the
road and the parade was allowed to complete its original route.
There then followed several days of rioting, violence, and de-
struction of property in Nationalist areas of the north. One man
was killed when he was crushed by a police vehicle. 3
There was widespread condemnation of the violence, and
there was concern that the police had been clearly seen to give
in to the threat of escalating violence. The rule of law had been
11. JARMAN & BRYAN, supra note 5.
12. Keith Bryett, Does Drumcree '96 Tell Us Anything About the RUC?, 1997 CRITICAL
CRIMINOLOGY 8.
13. COMMITTEE ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE MISRULE OF LAw: A REPORT ON
THE POLICING OF EvENTs DURING THE SUMMER OF 1996 IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1996).
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all too visibly undermined, and the RUC had lost much of its
credibility among the majority of the Nationalist community and
among a large proportion of the Protestant community. The
parade disputes again rose to the top of the political agenda and
assumed a greater significance than the continuing absence of
an IRA cease-fire. It was also finally clear that the current means
of adjudicating over contested parades would need to be re-
viewed. On July 15, the Secretary of State Sir Patrick Mayhew
announced that he was instigating an Independent Review of Pa-
rades and Marches to review the legal controls and management
of public assemblies. The review body would be expected to re-
port by January 1997. Furthermore, when it was clear that no
local agreement was forthcoming over the Relief of Derry parade
on August 10, the Secretary of State announced that he was ban-
ning all parades over the contested section of the route between
August 7-31.14 This announcement was the first time that pa-
rades had been formally prohibited (rather than re-routed)
since a general six month ban had been imposed by Prime Min-
ister James Chichester-Clark in late July 1970.
V. THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW
The Independent Review of Parades and Marches was
chaired by Dr. Peter North, Vice-Chancellor of Oxford Univer-
sity. He was assisted by Father Oliver Crilly, a parish priest from
County Tyrone and the Very Reverend John Dunlop, a former
moderator of the Presbyterian Church. The work of the review
body began in August 1996 and the final report was published at
the end of January 1997. There were three principle means of
gathering evidence, information, and opinion. First, key individ-
uals and organizations were asked to make written submissions
suggesting how the problem might be addressed, and the review
body also announced that it would welcome submissions from
any other interested party. Some three hundred submissions
were eventually received. The review body did not publish these
submissions, but a number were publicly available. These indi-
cated a range of opinions as to how the issue should be ad-
dressed. Most interested parties recognized the need for some
form of change. There was some consensus around the idea of
14. NEILJARMAN ET AL., BELFAST DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE, POLITICS IN PUBLIC: FREE-
DOM OF ASSEMBLY AND THE RIGHT TO PROTEST - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1998).
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an independent body to oversee the issue among the middle
ground and those not directly involved in the disputes, but there
were wide differences of opinion among those with a stronger
interest in the matter. Those submissions by the SDLP, the Alli-
ance Party, the Women's Coalition, the Standing Advisory Com-
mission on Human Rights ("SACHR"), and the Committee on
the Administration of Justice ("CAJ") favored some form of in-
dependent body to adjudicate over the disputes. Sinn Fain and
the Ulster Democratic Party placed the emphasis on the need
for local accommodation, with each party acknowledging the
need to balance rights and responsibilities. In contrast, the
Ulster Unionist Party recommended creating different catego-
ries of parade, which would ensure that the traditional parades
of the marching orders would be guaranteed secure free passage
by the police.
The second stage of the review was to follow up the written
submissions by holding a number of meetings with key parties
and actors to clarify the points made and to tease out the more
complicated issues. As part of this follow up, the review team
visited many of the areas that had been subjected to disputes.
The third form of opinion was gathered by carrying out a major
public survey of attitudes to the problem of parades and protests.
A general poll of attitudes was carried out across Northern Ire-
land, and eleven detailed local surveys were made in Belfast,
Derry, Portadown, and a number of smaller centers. The survey
results were each published as separate volumes of the final re-
port.
The report of the Independent Review"5 made a total of
forty-three recommendations. It began by setting out a series of
fundamental principles, which it considered formed the basis for
addressing the disputes. These principles stated that the right to
peaceful assembly should (subject to certain qualifications) be
protected, but that the exercise of such rights brings with it cer-
tain responsibilities, and in particular people should take ac-
count of the likely effect of their actions on their relationships
with other parts of the community. The principles also stated
that parties should work towards the resolution of problems
through local accommodation and should not commit or con-
done criminal acts or offensive behavior. They also argued that
15. NORTH ET AL., supra note 8.
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any process of adjudication should be clear and consistent and
applied with as much openness as possible.
Having set out the general principles, the main recommen-
dation was that a body, to be known as the Parades Commission,
should be set up to have overall responsibility for dealing with
disputes over parades. The report suggested that the Commis-
sion should have educational, conflict resolution, and adjudica-
tory roles: it should promote a greater understanding of the sig-
nificance and meaning of parades at a local level; it should en-
courage local dialogue and facilitate mediation to address any
disputes and concerns; and only if these processes fail, it should
step in to impose legally binding determinations. To encourage
time for dialogue, the report recommended that the notification
period for all parades be increased from seven to twenty-one
days. The report noted that as a result of these recommenda-
tions, the police would no longer have power to impose condi-
tions or to re-route contested parades. However, it recom-
mended that the Chief Constable should have the right to ap-
peal a decision to the Secretary of State and that the police
should retain the power to intervene on grounds of concern for
public order.
The report was given a mixed reception. Nationalists
tended to favor the recommendations, while Unionists were gen-
erally negative, seeing the concept of a commission as a "charter
for grievances" and little more than a loosely-disguised strategy
to stop their parades. The Government gave the report a warm
welcome and Sir Patrick Mayhew announced that the Parades
Commission (or "Commission") would be set up in the immedi-
ate future. However, he also stated that as in the first instance
the Commission would not have a statutory basis, but it would
therefore have a restricted range of responsibilities, principally
to promote and to facilitate dialogue and mediation. At the
same time, Sir Patrick announced that he would undertake a fur-
ther round of consultation before acting on the key proposals in
the report. The Government did agree to minor changes to the
existing legislation. It accepted the recommendation that the
notification period be extended to twenty-one days and that the
powers of the police be increased to control alcohol at public
processions. These changes were enacted as the Public Order
(Amendment) (Northern Ireland) Order 1997. The increase in
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notification came into effect in time for the 1997 marching sea-
son, but the powers to control alcohol were never utilized.
The response of the Government was seen to be a result of
their weak position in the House of Commons and their reliance
on the support of the Ulster Unionist Party, who did not favor
the formation of a Commission with legal powers to oversee pa-
rades. In contrast, the shadow Secretary for Northern Ireland,
Mo Mowlam, announced that if the Labour Party formed the
next government after the forthcoming General Election, then
she would implement the recommendations in full. Neverthe-
less, it was clear that the Commission would not have the power
to issue legal rulings over parades for the foreseeable future and
that for the forthcoming marching season, the RUC would re-
tain the power and responsibility to deal with the problems.
Once again, the main concern was over the Drumcree
Church parade in Portadown. Intensive efforts were made by
the new Secretary of State, Mo Mowlam, and others to find an
acceptable compromise over the issue of the parade along the
Garvaghy Road. However, when none were forthcoming the
new Chief Constable, Ronnie Flanagan, decided that the issue
should be dealt with as swiftly as possible. Rather than face a
third stand-off and the likelihood of extensive protests, the RUC
and British Army moved on to the Garvaghy Road in the early
hours of the morning of July 6, clearing the residents from the
road and securing the area until the parade passed along in the
early afternoon. Although this action was widely condemned by
the Nationalist community, strong pressure was brought to bear
on the Orange Order to make a reciprocal gesture. As a result,
they announced that they would voluntarily re-route parades on
the Ormeau Road and in Armagh, Derry, and Newry on the
Twelfth of July. The most tense week of the summer therefore
passed relatively quietly in the end.
In a number of the other locations where disputes were
ongoing, the police imposed what they regarded as an appropri-
ate compromise. In Bellaghy, the loyal orders were permitted to
walk as far as the Orange Hall but no further. In Dunloy, where
the loyal orders had rejected the residents' offer of a limited
number of parades, the police stopped all the parades at the Or-
ange Hall on the edge of the village. No parades were allowed to
pass along the lower Ormeau Road. In Newtownbutler, the
protesters were restricted to the edge of the town and the pa-
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rades were allowed to follow their desired route. Overall, there
was a small increase in the number of disputed parades and ob-
jections were raised for the first time in a few areas, but the prob-
lem seemed to have reached a certain balanced impasse. In gen-
eral, the loyal orders refused to talk with members of the resi-
dents' groups, while the residents' groups insisted that face-to-
face dialogue could resolve the problem. In some areas, notably
Derry, Dromore, and Castlewellan, local dialogue and mediation
did produce an agreement that was acceptable to most parties,
but these also always remained both short-term and fragile exer-
cises in crisis management, rather than providing a permanent
resolution to the problems.
VI. PUBLIC PROCESSIONS ACT
The Government had promised a full implementation of
the recommendation contained in the report of the Independ-
ent Review, and in October 1997, it published the' Public Proces-
sions Etc. (Northern Ireland) Bill, 6 which was designed to fulfill
that promise. The original bill received a small number of
amendments before it was enacted as the Public Processions
(Northern Ireland) Act 1 7 (or "Act") in February 1998. There
were two principal changes: one clause was deleted and one ad-
ded. Clause 3 of the bill was removed. These changes had ex-
tended the responsibilities of the Commission to keeping under
review other expressions of cultural identity that occurred in
public (except sporting events) and that might have an adverse
impact on community relations. It was believed that this clause
was introduced to try to placate Unionist opposition to the bill
by widening its focus beyond, parades. However, it was not clear
what might be included under this remit except perhaps other
expressions of Loyalist political culture such as street paintings,
Orange arches, and bonfires. The clause was eventually re-
moved with few objections. The main addition was a clause that
provided a requirement for advance notice of protests. This new
clause was seen to impose some degree of balance by extending
controls to both parties to the disputes. Subsidiary documents
issued by the Parades Commission were also extended to include
protests within their framework.
16. Public Processions Etc. (Northern Ireland) Bill (1997).
17. Public Processions (Northern Ireland) Act. 1998, ch. 2 (Eng.).
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The main provision of the Act is to give a statutory basis to
the Parades Commission, to set out its powers and responsibili-
ties, and to define the limits to its powers. The Act also incorpo-
rates provisions regarding the control and management of pa-
rades that were formerly included within the 1987 Public Order
(Northern Ireland) Order. The main features of the legislation
are set forth below.
Clause 1 provides for establishing a body "to be known as
the Parades Commission for Northern Ireland."'" Schedule 1
limits the membership of the Commission to a chairman and not
more than six other members. Members are to be appointed for
a term not exceeding three years, but the Act allows for their re-
appointment.
Clause 2 sets out the general duties and powers of the Com-
mission. Clause 2(1) describes the general duties thus: to pro-
mote greater understanding of the issues relating to public
processions; to promote and facilitate mediation as a means of
resolving disputes; and to keep generally informed about both
the conduct of public assemblies and the legislation under re-
view.19 Clause 2(2) (a) states that the Commission should facili-
tate mediation and "take such other steps as appear . . . to be
appropriate for resolving . . . disputes. '20 Failing to take such
action, the Commission should "issue determinations in respect
of particular proposed public processions. '21  Although the
Commission has a responsibility to monitor all parades, it is only
expected to issue determinations as a last resort and when at-
tempts to reach local accommodation had been exhausted.
Clauses 3, 4, and 5 command the Commission to draw up
and to keep under review three documents, a Code of Conduct,
Procedural Rules, and Guidelines, respectively. The draft docu-
ments were produced by the Commission in December 1997,
and following consultation with interested parties the final docu-
ments were published in February 1998. The Code of Conduct
defines the responsibilities and the acceptable levels of behavior
expected from parade organizers and protesters. The Proce-
dural Rules set out the steps that the Commission will take in
18. Id. c. 1.
19. Id. c. 2(1).
20. Id. c. 2(2)(a).
21. Id. c. 2(2)(b).
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gathering evidence and making legal determinations. The
Guidelines set out the factors that the Commission will take into
account in issuing its determination. This document is basically
an elaboration of the criteria set down in Clause 8(6) .22
Clause 6 extends the notification period for all public
processions to twenty-eight days.2 1 Clause 6(5) (a) excluded fu-
neral processions from this requirement and the subsequent in-
troduction of the Public Processions (Northern Ireland) Act
1998 (Notice of Processions) (Exceptions) Order 1998 similarly
excluded Salvation Army processions held along a customary
route from providing advance notification. Clause 7 provides
that organizers of protest meetings related to public processions
must provide fourteen days notification to the police. 24 Such no-
tification is to be supplied by the organizers to the police on the
appropriate form,25 and the police must then supply a copy of
the form to the Parades Commission.26 Failure to provide the
information is an offense, the penalty being a term of imprison-
ment not exceeding six months, a fine not exceeding level five
on the standard scale, or both.27
Clause 8 defines the powers of the Commission to impose
conditions on public processions. 21 In particular, Clause 8(6)
sets out the following five factors that should be taken into ac-
count:
(a) any public disorder or damage which may result from the
procession; (b) any disruption to the life of the community
which the procession may cause; (c) any impact which the
procession may have on relationships within the community;
(d) any failure ... to comply with the Code of Conduct; (e)
the desirability of allowing a procession customarily held
along a particular route to be held along that route. 29
Failure to comply with conditions imposed under this section is
an offense with similar level of punishment to those set out in
Clause 6(10). 30 Clause 9 allows for the Chief Constable to ap-
22. Id. c. 8(6).
23. Id. c. 6.
24. Id. c. 7.
25. Id. cls. 6(3), 7(3).
26. Id. cls. 6(6), 7(5).
27. Id. cls. 6(10), 7(9).
28. Id. c. 8.
29. Id. c. 8(6).
30. Id. c. 6(10).
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peal to the Secretary of State for a review of any determination. 1
However, Clause 10 confirms "the common law powers of a con-
stable to take action to deal with or prevent a breach of the
peace. 32 Clause 1 defines the powers of the Secretary of State to
prohibit a public procession.13 Any decision to prohibit a pro-
cession must be based on factors (a), (b), and (c) set out in
Clause 8(6) above, but the Secretary should also have regard for
"any undue demands which the procession may cause to be
made on the police or military forces."3 4
Clause 12 allows for a system of registration for bands.
This clause has been in all public order legislation since 1971,
but has never been implemented. Clause 13 allows for the con-
trol of alcohol at public processions, a provision carried over
from the Public Order (Amendment) (Northern Ireland) 1997,
which was repealed under the Public Processions Act. 36 Finally,
Clause 14 makes it an offense to prevent, hinder, or break up a
public procession.
Reaction to the new legislation was, perhaps unsurprisingly,
mixed. Unionist politicians and members of the loyal orders saw
the Act as a specific attack on their cultural practices and one
that was concerned with providing a legal basis for stopping pa-
rades. Each of the loyal orders announced that they would not
recognize the authority of the Parades Commission and would
not meet with it or engage with its process. The legislation re-
ceived a more cautious welcome from the Nationalist commu-
nity, although many people were concerned about how effec-
tively the law would be implemented. There were also two par-
ticular areas of the Act that gave more widespread cause for
concern. One was that the five criteria that the Commission
should base all their determinations gave too great a promi-
nence to concerns for public order and too much significance to
traditional parades ("processions customarily held along a par-
ticular route"). It was feared that the emphasis on public order
might limit the space in which the Commission could work to
31. Id. c. 9.
32. Id. c. 10.
33. Id. c. 11.
34. Id. c. 11(1)(c).
35. Id. c. 12.
36. Id. c. 13.
37. Id. c. 14.
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that already defined by the police and would also give too much
status to the evidence that the police gave based on their confi-
dential intelligence, rather than allowing the Commission to fo-
cus on the significance of utilizing concepts of human rights and
social responsibilities to frame their determination. Similarly,
giving special status to traditional parades seemed to replicate
past practices, which had largely excluded traditional parades
from legal controls. Nevertheless, it was hoped that the inclu-
sion of the other three categories, especially those relating to
effects on community relations, would mitigate the overall signif-
icance of these two factors.
The other area of concern was over the powers that the po-
lice retained to intervene in a dispute. There were two areas
where this was clearly applicable. The Chief Constable alone
had the right to appeal against a determination to the Secretary
of State, and the police could still invoke a fear for public order
on the day of a parade and reverse, or override, a determination
made by the Commission. Given that the Chief Constable had
expressed some concern about the appropriateness of empower-
ing the Commission to deal with problems over parades and that
many sections of the Unionist community had reiterated a pref-
erence to the police retaining their existing powers, there was a
worry that exercise of these powers by the police might serve to
undermine the Commission. In fact, over the first year of the
operation of the Public Processions (Northern Ieland) Act, the
police have been content to implement the determinations of
the Commission. They have neither sought an appeal to the Sec-
retary of State nor invoked concerns over public order to over-
ride a determination. Instead, having the Parades Commission
take the formal decisions over disputes has reduced the pressure
on the police; they are no longer seen as making politically-moti-
vated decisions and they have therefore been able to concen-
trate on policing the events on the ground.
VII. PARADES COMMISSION
The Parades Commission was set up in March 1997, but
lacking any legal powers, its initial remit was restricted to learn-
ing about the problems, making local contacts, and facilitating
dialogue. It remained a marginal player during the 1997 march-
ing season, and it was only with the enactment of the Public
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Processions (Northern Ireland) Act in February 1998 that the
Commission had full responsibility for dealing with parade dis-
putes. However, by this time the Commission had already been
subject to a number of crises, and it was attempting to exercise
its legal authority at a time of widespread skepticism over its
credibility and its capacity to act as an independent body.
The first crisis occurred when a confidential NIO document
suggesting that Alistair Graham, the chair of the Commission,
was party to the planning of a political strategy to deal with the
Drumcree parade in June 1997 was leaked shortly after the
parade was forced through. The document cast doubts on the
veracity of those who claimed to be attempting to reach an ac-
ceptable compromise. Although attempts were made to dismiss
the document as nothing more than a perfectly normal elabora-
tion of one possible approach, Nationalists became more wary of
the Commission and suspicious of its claimed independence and
neutrality.
A series of problems also bedevilled the Commission over its
membership. Initially, there were five commissioners. Alistair
Graham, an English trade unionist and Director of the Industrial
Society, was appointed as the chair. He was to be assisted by five
local people. Some attempt was made to follow the recommen-
dations of the Independent Review that the commission should
have a cross-community and geographical balance, although less
effort was made to achieve a gender balance. The members
were David Hewitt, a solicitor and founder of the evangelical or-
ganization ECONI and Roy Magee, a Presbyterian minister, both
of whom were from the Belfast area; Berna McIvor, a former
election agent of SDLP leader John Hume; and Frank Guckian,
Director of the Derry Chamber of Commerce. There was some
initial complaining about the composition of the body, particu-
larly from the loyal orders who saw Hewitt as opposed to the
loyal orders and McIvor as too partisan. However, these objec-
tions were not strongly raised possibly partly because the Com-
mission had no legal powers to intervene at this time.
Problems began in December 1997, when Roy Magee re-
signed because he felt that he would be better employed as a
mediator outside of the framework of the Commission, and then
in February 1998 Berna McIvor also resigned for personal rea-
sons. These two members were swiftly replaced by four new
Commissioners because the Public Processions Act allowed for a
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seven-person body. There was some degree of controversy over
all four members. Glen Barr and Tommy Cheevers were both
from a working-class Protestant background and brought on to
counter complaints that the Commission was too remote from
the key actors to the dispute and not sensitive enough to the
significance of the events. However, objections were made that
Barr had a background in Loyalist politics and had been a key
figure in the 1974 Ulster Worker's Strike, while Cheevers was a
member of the Apprentice Boys and his own branch club was
party to a parade dispute. They were seen to be too close to one
side. Furthermore, Nationalists felt that the two new members
from a Catholic background, Aidan Canavan and Rose-Anne Mc-
Cormick, both with legal backgrounds, were too middle-class
and closely aligned to the state. McCormick had also been a
member of the Police Authority. Two middle-class Catholics
were not felt to balance two working-class Loyalists. The Com-
mission had barely weathered the opposition to the new mem-
bers when in April both Barr and Cheevers resigned, citing "in-
tolerable" pressures and personal reasons. Having tried to cre-
ate a more widely-balanced membership, the Commission now
settled for a lower profile. The two commissioners who were ap-
pointed to replace Barr and Cheevers, in June 1998, were Wil-
liam Martin, a former president of the Ulster Farmer's Union
and member of the Police Authority, and Dr. Barbara Erwin,
who has a background in education. This chain of events illus-
trates some of the continuing problems involved in trying to cre-
ate an independent body that is perceived to be both sufficiently
informed and non-partisan. While Nationalists objected to a
bias in a Commission comprising middle-class Nationalists and
working-class Loyalists, it was also clear that there was a reluc-
tance on the part of working-class Nationalists to sit on such a
body. In the end, the Commission settled for a membership
with a lower public profile and attempted to create a less-person-
alized corporate image.
Although the exact chain of events was not publicly re-
vealed, the resignation of Barr and Cheevers occurred at the
same time as the Commission suffered another crisis. Under the
Procedural Rules, it was stated that the Commission would issue
a preliminary view of the forthcoming marching season. This
rule was to be an attempt to provide an overview of how each of
the parades might be dealt with in each of the contested areas.
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Although it was to be only a guide to the Commission's thinking,
not legally binding and therefore open to revision, it would nev-
ertheless indicate how the Commission viewed each of the most
contentious areas. Crucially, it would provide the first real indi-
cation of whether the Drumcree parade was likely to be re-
routed or allowed down the Garvaghy Road. The Commission
had intended to issue the preliminary view prior to the first con-
tentious parade on Easter Monday, but as a result of the changes
in the Commissioners the issuance was delayed and publication
was planned for late April. However, there was concern in polit-
ical circles on the effect that the publication of such a potentially
controversial document would have on the wider peace process
and in particular on the voting on the referendum on the Good
Friday Agreement. When Prime Minister Tony Blair personally
intervened and asked the Commission to rethink their strategy,
the publication of a preliminary view was abandoned. The inter-
vention by Tony Blair was further seen to undermine the already
questioned independence of the Commission. It also raised con-
cerns about how ready the Government might be to intervene in
the future and how far the issue of parades would therefore be
subjected to political expediency rather than addressed accord-
ing to the principles and guidelines set down in the legislation.
The Parades Commission therefore embarked on its work
from a position considerably weaker than was desirable. Union-
ists had opposed its formation from the start. They saw it as an
undemocratic and unrepresentative quango and continued to
demand a reversion to the old system whereby the police had
authority over parades. The loyal orders refused to acknowledge
its authority or to engage with it in any way. Nationalists ques-
tioned the degree of its independence and had little faith that it
would deal with the issues on their terms. In the end, the Com-
mission weathered the storm of uncertainty surrounding its in-
augural weeks. As it began to issue determinations, it became
clear that these would broadly follow the pattern established by
the RUC over the previous two years. Without any local dialogue
or attempt to address local concerns, the Commission was reluc-
tant to authorize a parade through an area that did not welcome
it. There were therefore few surprises among the determina-
tions. Furthermore, it also became clear that the Commission
was reluctant to intervene without good reason or to react to
what it considered spurious or inflated concerns. It ignored re-
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quests by local traders in Holywood, County Down, by the police
in Derry, and by nationalists in Portadown, to issue constraints
on parades because it felt that in each of these cases this was not
justified.
One change in practice that was introduced, as a result of
the Procedural Rules, was that the Commission announced its
determinations five working days before the parade was due.
This change aimed to counter a criticism made of the police that
the decisions were left too late and this only encouraged a mobil-
ization of crowds on the streets. The police had countered by
saying that they were concerned that announcing a decision too
far in advance would allow the disappointed party more time to
mobilize and to organize a challenge to the ruling. In the end,
the decision to announce determinations in advance worked in
the favor of the Commission and if anything, allowed people to
prepare a peaceful, considered response rather than make a
knee-jerk reaction.
VIII. MARCHING THROUGH 1998
The main concern, as in previous years, focused on the
Drumcree Church parade on July 5. When the Commission an-
nounced that the parade would be re-routed, the police and the
army moved in to secure the area, the loyal orders announced
that they would walk their desired route regardless of the deter-
mination, and the Garvaghy Road Residents Group expressed
concern that the state would still give in to the threat of force
and push the parade through as they had in 1996. As the stand-
off continued, the Orange Order mobilized at the church and
loyalists protested across the North. Violence continued
through the week, but the reaction did not seem as strong as two
years previously. The death of the three Quinn brothers as a
result of a petrol bomb attack on their home on Sunday, July 12,
undermined much of the support for the Orange protests.
Although the protests have continued at the church since July,
and support has remained strong in the Portadown area, wider
support has ebbed and flowed. The Orange Order has divided
on the issue of how far they should oppose the law over the right
to parade, and the protesters at Drumcree are clearly seen as
part of the Unionist opposition to the Good Friday Agreement.
Many Orangemen are divided between wanting to retain their
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right to march, but also supporting the moves toward a constitu-
tional and political settlement. Many have been horrified at the
scale of the violence that the issue has generated and are con-
fused about the next step to take. However, such is the confu-
sion, uncertainty, and disunity within the Unionist community
that no political figure has been willing or able to offer a lead.
David Trimble has epitomized the quandary faced by Unionist
politicians. He achieved his position as leader of the Ulster
Unionists on the back of his prominent support for the Orange-
men at Drumcree in 1995 and 1996. He has opposed and chal-
lenged the status of the Parades Commission and once again
called for it to be disbanded in his New Year statement. But his
only solution to the problem seems to be that the Orangemen
should be allowed to complete their walk along the Garvaghy
Road. In spite of his status as MP for Portadown, he refuses to
speak with his constituents on the Garvaghy Road, and in spite of
his new status as First Minister, he refuses to take a non-partisan
line and to attempt to find a compromise. The failure of David
Trimble, and other local politicians, to move away from a sectar-
ian position on this issue illustrates why it seems likely that the
Parades Commission will be required for the foreseeable future.
In spite of its uncertain status at the start of the 1998 march-
ing season, the Parades Commission slowly established a degree
of credibility, authority, and independence. Most determina-
tions were accepted as having a full legal authority even when
they were inevitably opposed by one side. The decision to allow
the Orangemen to parade along the Ormeau Road on the morn-
ing of the Twelfth was subjected to a judicial review, but the
judge supported the Commission's arguments that it was justi-
fied in taking into account the wider-political picture on this
occasion. In many respects, the Commission's work was made
easier as a result of the refusal of the loyal orders to engage in
the process. But it is clear that ignoring the Commission will not
result in disputed parades being allowed to take place. The po-
lice have also made it clear that having the Commission empow-
ered to rule on parades has made their work easier and there
has been no suggestion that they might seek to challenge any
determination. The Orange card does not appear to have the
same power it once had, and the loyal orders will need to re-
think their strategy if they wish to walk along many of the con-
tested routes.
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Nevertheless, the approach of Drumcree V in July 1999 re-
mains one of the major threats to the peace process. One
should not underestimate the symbolic significance of the
parade for many members of the Unionist community. The fact
that no parade took place along the Garvaghy Road in 1998 re-
mains an unresolved problem for Orangemen. The fact that no
wider compromise was achieved remains an unresolved problem
for Nationalists. The fact that the stand-off continues remains
an unresolved problem for the Parades Commission, the police,
the British Government, the Irish Government, and all parties
that want to see the peace process consolidated.
